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In Contrast: An American
Strategy
In 1963, when we set up the Cleveland
Committee on Soviet Anti-Semitism to advocate for Soviet Jews,
it was a no-brainer. There were models to guide us. After all it was
mid- 20th century America with advocacy groups aplenty, all stripes
and sizes. The CCSA was to be public and inclusive and seek all the
media attention and political support that could be garner for the
cause. And when, a couple of years later, we realized that the
American Jewish Conference on Soviet
Jewry was incapable of leading a credible national effort, we
directed our attention to alternatives.
Khutzpedik (brazen) as it may seem, we soon drafted a
strategy for the long haul the product of confabs with Herb Caron,
Dan Litt, Dave Gitlin and me. In a May 17, 1965 letter to Dr. Louis
Nemzer, professor of history, Ohio State University, I outlined our
conclusions:
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We in Cleveland are
operating on the premise that vital to a solution of
this problem is 1) the U.S. government on record as
condemning Soviet anti-Semitic practices and 2) the U.S.
government prepared to exact concessions, at an
appropriate time, from the Soviet leaders involving
cessation of their anti-Jewish policies. To bring this
about, public opinion must be developed on this issue
(as it was toward U.S.-Israeli relations). It is a long
difficult task and not one that can be accomplished by a
single rally or demonstration. It will require an
ongoing effort in every sizable community in this
country. The CCSA in Cleveland has been created for this
purpose. |
To read the letter,
click here.
And in a 1967 letter to the editor of the Cleveland Jewish News I
list the vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union, which offer leverage
to persuade an alteration of unfavorable and injurious Jewish
policies.
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I would question your
assertion that we in this country are helpless to aid
our brethren in the Soviet Union. Let us try to separate
myth from reality. It is true that Russia is a world
power. However, Russia cannot go it alone. She requires
the aid, cooperation, and good will of others, including
the United States. This has been amply demonstrated in
recent years. Let me give a few examples.
In the economic sphere, the Soviet Union has attempted
to increase trade with the West. The Soviet Union has
purchased enormous quantities of wheat from the U.S. and
Canada to offset serious crop failures. In addition, she
seeks to increase the purchase of Western manufactured
goods to meet consumer demand at home. For all these the
Soviet Union needs dollars, which it hopes to get
through the sale of goods and raw materials to the west.
In the political sphere, the presence of a militant
China on the Soviet Union's extensive eastern border is
an ominous threat. The Soviet Union has sought and will
seek rapprochement with the U.S. as a counter to this
threat.
In the ideological realm, the Soviet Union, as the
traditional representative of communism, has been
actively seeking to enlist the uncommitted nations of
the world to communism. In its role of communist
proselytizer and supposed champion of the downtrodden,
the Soviet Union is quite sensitive to criticism that
exposes its denial of human rights to its own
citizens.
I would say that the Soviet Union today,
because of its many needs, is responsive to outside
pressure moral as well as political and economic. |
To read the letter,
click here.
With an eye on the North American scene, the executive board of the
CCSA established, in 1966, an adjunct the Council of Concern for
Soviet Jewry that I was pleased to manage. The mission of the CCSJ
was to encourage and nourish growth of local councils in U. S. and
Canada. That effort concluded four years later with the formation of
the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews. In
the fall of 1971, the UCSJ decided in convention to promote
legislation in the U.S. Congress that would entail economic
sanctions against countries that restrict freedom of emigration.
This led to introduction of HR 14806, A Bill to amend the Export
Administration Act of 1969 in order to promote freedom of emigration.
Although the bill went down two votes short of approval by the
Banking and Currency Committee of the House, it foreshadowed the
Jackson-Vanik legislation introduced in
Congress five months later.
The rest is history: success of political action
over shtadlanut, private negotiations.
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